






















To continue with a project, which is failing in an escalating manner, are an economically irrational decision, 
but one, which contains psychological motivations. The decision-makers display some difficulty in failing to 
consider the costs arising from the past and keep investing new resources. This is the “Sunk Cost 
Effect”(SCE), the main subject of this research. 
Two assumptions were developed. (1) The probability of continuing to invest increases as the non-returned 
investment (the sunk cost) is greater and is closer to the total planned investment. (2) The decision to go on 
investing when the sunk cost is stated as a percentage of the planned one is more likely to happen than when 
the sunk cost is stated in absolute terms. 
The hypotheses were tested on two hundred postgraduate students, distributed randomly among eight groups 
of twenty five students, each independent of one another, using a 2x4 experimental plan, where the 
independent variables are as follows: the investment carried out, structured according to four different levels 
and the way in which the investment levels are expressed; in other words as an absolute or percentage value 
compared to the amount planned for investment. The dependent variable is dichotomous in its answers - yes or 
no answers - to continue with a lost investment. 
The results largely confirm the hypotheses formulated. Effectively, the size of the sunk cost and the proximity 
to the end of the initial objective has an amplifying effect on the decision to persist with the investment, which 
is not bearing fruit. Moreover, with the exception of extreme situations, the decision-makers reveal a greater 
willingness to continue with the investment when the problem is presented in proportional terms. 
The conclusion is that the “Sunk Cost Effect” exists and motivates economically irrational forms of behavior. 
The decision-maker is a “slave” to past decisions, thus increasing the sunk cost and finds him in difficulties he 
is unable to overcome. In some situations, the percentage form of expressing the investment seems to more 
vigorously induce economically erroneous decisions. 
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News of projects that fail or projects, which is continuously losing frequently, appears in the 
media. 
“... I felt that it was an irreversible process and. I tried everything, but...” 
 (Pedro Caldeira1 in “ Independent”, newspaper dated 3 July 1992, P3) 
What are the motives, which led this stockbroker to involve himself in a successively losing 
process? Why didn’t this man give up and cut his losses? Why did this stockbroker 
continue, playing with good money after bad money? 
Other conflicting situations, such as the escalating that so often happens at auctions when 
parties consciously exceed the market value of the items sold, or the situations referred to as 
the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) reveal irrational forms of 
behavior. 
All these situations could be considered as situations of irrational escalating commitment to 
a particular course of action whose decisions call for explanation. Economic behavior, that 
is, the homo economicus behavior founded on rationality, is poorly represented in such 
situations.  
Also, I do not find in these cases, as with that of Pedro Caldeira, and even the auction parties 
or the situations described in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, the virtual rationality, in the sense 
of the search for some satisfaction, as opposed to maximization of the expected utility. I do 
                                                          
1 Pedro Caldeira was a famous stockbroker from Lisbon’s stock market. According the media in 1992, he 
procured private clients’ money on which he was to pay an interest rate above the market average. This money 
he invested in the Lisbon stock market. Soon he felt the need to successively commit more money to fulfil his 
previous obligations. He entered an escalating process which ended up with his flight to another country and 






not therefore see a bounded rationality2 (Simon, 1957) or a restricted rationality3 exists 
(March, 1978); on the contrary, I see an unrestrained search for the all or nothing choice 
type. 
The decision-maker’s behavior seems to be, in fact, to ascertain the best way and the best 
result. This may accounts for his unrestrained search. That is why, from a certain point in 
time, opting for a result that is not the best, clearly reveals economically irrational behavior. 
Theoretical Framing 
There thus seems to exist a significant psychological behavior, which leads people to persist 
in following an irrational course of action, from the economic standpoint. The reason why 
this happens is the subject of this study. 
Conlon and Wolf (1983), affirm that the impact of past decisions on subsequent decisions 
can lead to systematic deviations from economic rationality. When facing investments 
already performed in resource reallocation, the decision-makers are influenced by a complex 
and probably conflicting variety of interdependent forces. According to Staw (1981), these 
interdependencies create what the author refers to as courses of action. Any investment in 
time, money or energy can be a sunk cost in a particular course of action. 
For Rumiati, Bonini and Legrenzi (1993) the sunk cost issue is that whose subject must 
solve a decision dilemma: “The persistence dilemma”. Stick to the previously made decision 
or dump it? This “Decision Pathology” as seen by Staw and Ross (1989) is referred to in the 
                                                          
2 Herbert Simon argues in favour of bounded rationality, considering that the person has specific limitations as 
is the information he possesses. “The size of research space can thus determine that, due to our limited 
capacity we are content to obtain satisfaction and not optimisation. Therefore we adopt a bounded rationality 
process” (Pereira 1990) 
3 March argues that rationality is not only bounded but restricted. Beyond specific human limitations and 
available information, there are different kinds of rational behaviour: contextual rationality, rationality in 







literature in different but related ways: escalation commitment (Staw, 1981), psychology of 
entrapment (Brockner, 1982) and sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). 
The sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985) is shown by the tendency revealed by a 
person in proceeding with a project because of the considerable investment made in it, even 
if quitting were the best decision in his own interests. That is, the response of an individual 
to the persistence dilemma is influenced by the presence of the sunk cost, contrary to what is 
estimated in the economic model. 
From an economic point of view, the decision to continue with a project should not be 
influenced by past investments. In economics, only the future expenses and investments are 
considered. The past expenses are irrelevant. They are historical costs that should not be 
considered in future courses of action. The starting point for the action should be the current 
situation and all the alternatives should be considered, estimating only the associated future 
benefits and costs associated with each alternative4. Meanwhile, it seems, that decision-
makers adopt psychologically important attitudes revealing some difficulty in not focusing 
on past investments without return, while continuing to invest more and more new money. 
It is therefore evident that the negative results of a project may lead the individual to 
reinforce his commitment with a view to justifying the first investment decision. In addition, 
this means spending more money. 
Staw (1976, 1981) and Staw and Ross (1978, 1987), in Escalation Commitment Paradigm, 
mention that this type of investment reinforcement is the result of the sunk cost effect (SCE) 
on the decision-maker. 
                                                          
4 Singer (1993), referring to the importance of future investments only on the economic decision, calls it the 
normative Ignoring the Cost Principle (ISCP), in which the past expenses incurred by A in the time period Ti 






He does it to protect his self-esteem, trying to save face to himself or others. Ribeiro (1990) 
quoting Staw (1980) refers to behavior as being a retrospective rationality. Retrospective, 
because is related to the SCE and rationality because this is the wish of the decision-maker. 
According to this, the decision-maker is justifying his past behavior. 
If the investment escalation happens in a self-justification dynamic, then it will only be 
observed when the decision-maker feels personally responsible for the original investments. 
This self-justification behavior seems to find support in the Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
(Festinger, 1957). According to this theory, when two cognitions are inconsistent, and this 
inconsistency threatens the decision-maker’s self-esteem, he manifests a psychological 
tension, which will motivate him to reduce it. Changing one or both cognitions can reduce 
this tension. 
Having made a significant investment in time, money or effort in a project, when the 
decision- maker perceives a worse result than initially foreseen, he is faced with two 
inconsistent cognitive situations. The one that caused him to start and continue with the 
project and the  
Situation which does not match the expectations. How is he to solve it? The decision-maker 
begins manifesting tension because the situation indicates contrary signs. To reduce his 
tension, he adopts the attitude that least affects his self-esteem by continuing with the 
project, in which he invested his money. The tendency will be to develop an even bigger 
commitment. This enlarged commitment is, to some extent, explained by the Kurt Lewin 
Camp Theory (1936). 
In a state of tension, the decision-maker assumes a behavior that tends towards the 





an adverse situation, a negative valencias region, with behavior in search of positive 
valencias positions. 
To reach the goal is the decisive factor in discharging the tension. The need felt by the 
decision-maker to discharge his tension prompts him to remain active, by investing to reach 
the goal. 
According to Kurt Lewin, the tension corresponds to a psychological force and is all the 
greater the closer the subject is to the objective5. 
Therefore, we can say that the irrational decision will probably occur more frequently, when 
the subject is closer to the objective. In an unfinished task, the decision-maker suffers a 
double remembrance effect before any unfinished task, the consequence of a state of higher 
tension (Zeigarnick effect6). 
Brockner (1982) maintains that individuals constantly redefine the nature of their 
involvement as they become more engaged in the choice of the course of action. While the 
conflict is being “trapped” the rational information ceases to exert an influence on the 
subject. He becomes more emotionally involved and worried about his social image and/ or 
the most appropriate motives for his bad investment results (sunk costs). In escalating 
investment literature, reinvestment occurs in a significant way among the parties who take 
the initial decision. 
The hierarchy regards Fox and Staw (1979), cited by Harrison and Harrel, concluded that 
self-protecting and coherent behavior by top decision-makers as both natural and rational. 
                                                          
5 However, the psychological force exists, not only at the level of making, but also at the level of thinking, 
reality, so a task may be physically terminated buy not psychologically. 
6 Zeigarnick (1927, 1938), demonstated there was a preferential remembrance by people for unfinished tasks, 
and he expressed it in the mathematical ratio 
Remembrance of unfinished tasks 
Remembrance of finished tasks 
This ratio is greater than zero and very close to two. It became known as the Zeigarnik quotient and its 





This is being so, the decision-makers may continue with a losing project through a self-
protecting, defensive reaction. 
In addition, when these self-defense, self-justification motives do not exist, or when self-
esteem is not threatened? How can one explain the investment escalation? 
Thaler (1980) and Whyte (1986) argue that the explanation can be found in the Prospective 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1982, 1984) (TP). The Prospective theory says that 
the framing will strongly influence evaluation and choice. Before guaranteed gains, there 
exists a risk aversion. However, before guaranteed losses, there is a choice of risk, although 
the likely future loss may be even greater, and the decision-maker continues with his failed 
project. It is a theory based on an escalation model associated with risk, and represented by 
a function. 
Whereas, in the Camp theory by Kurt Lewin the decision is taken according to the 
constellation and adjacency of the valences7 in the TP, the decision is taken according to the 
way in which the problem is framed. 
The Prospective Theory appears to explain some inconsistencies in decision taking. In fact, 
the Prospective Theory deviates from the rational principle of choice of the higher estimate 
utility. It is based on a model in which a function is defined in terms of positive and negative 
deviation from a point of reference. In other words, in profits and losses and not in wealth or 
total accumulated assets: 
There are the main explanations for the investment escalation phenomenon in a negative 
course of action resulting from a sunk cost effect. The explanation for self-justification, in 
which the decision-makers, faced with the already lost costs, reaffirm their previous 





decision-makers feel an attraction for risk when in a negative framing, that is, when in a 
decision concerning losses, the decision-makers tend to opt for those which may involve 
higher future losses when compared with guaranteed results (that have already occurred) of 
losses, albeit lower. 
Others authors have different explanations for the SCE: 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggest that investments in a negative course from action can be 
due to the “Desire not to dissipate”. One of the reasons for preferring to play good money 
after bad money is that to stop the investment would imply admitting to the absolute loss of 
the money already spent. Thus, to avoid the losses the decision-maker continues to invest. 
In fact, Northcraft and Neale (1986), cited by Schaubroeck and Davis (1994)8 follow similar 
ideas and regard the phenomenon as an opportunity cost effect. 
They consider that Prospective Theory referring to a framing exclusively between 
persistence and retreat as a choice between certain losses and probable gains ignores the 
opportunity cost associated with persistence which arises from the decision-maker’s 
inability to diversify the unallocated resources. In other words, the decision-maker, through 
inflexibility, fails to consider other alternatives. Schaubroeck and Davis (1994) consider this 
the very dilemma: between reinvesting or giving up, which can create escalating situations 
in negative courses of action. 
Conlon and Walf (1980), refer to ambiguity as one of the factors influencing the taking of 
decisions in further resource allocation. In fact, ambiguity allows individuals to endorse 
responsibilities for social, regulatory reasons and others. This ability to disperse 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
7 The tension corresponds to the existence of a psychological need. The tension occurs whenever there is a 
valence. If the tension is zero, there is no valence, no tension, no room for motivated behaviour. 
 
8 ”Prospect Theory Predictions when Escalation is not the Only Chance to Recover Sunk Costs”. 






responsibility reduces the propensity for self-justification, notwithstanding personal 
involvement. On the other hand some projects exists whose evaluation, in terms of success 
or failure, is disputable or hard to define. This ambiguity effect may excuse the decision-
makers. That is why these authors claim that the existence of a well-structured task alone 
provides an equally well structured justification for the decision. Even a decision affected by 
previous decisions can, despite failing, be justified on the grounds of experimentation and 
apprenticeship. To define a strategy, to clearly envisage the problem and objectively 
establish the outlines of personal involvement can effectively moderate the effects of 
resource allocation behavior. 
Schaubroeck and Williams (1993) consider that some features of the decision-maker’s 
personality can influence continuity of the loosing project. And to that end, they refer to two 
types of effects: the hero effect, in which the decision-maker wants success at any price, 
despite the abortive initial decision; and the reaction effect, in which the decision-maker 
responds with an extraordinary additional motivation to try to cancel out any loss. There are, 
therefore, important individual differences in the personality, which can play a major role in 
this type of decision-making situations. 
Ross and Staw, (1994)9, citing Platt (1973), argue that those who managed to rise to leading 
positions may tend to strengthen “trapped” situations. Due to their success stories, they 
assume they will get round negative courses of action. It is therefore over-esteem, wherein it 
is difficult to imagine that any action exists that is not successful. 
Ross and Staw (1994), citing Nisbett and Ross (1980) in the same study, consider that the 
errors in information processing influence the escalation. In fact, people have a kind of 
                                                          
9 Organizational escalation and exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant”. Study made by Jerry 







mysterious ability to bias facts towards previously accepted beliefs and preferences, thus 
becoming overconfident. 
Northcraft and Wolf (1984) show that, over a period of time, the sooner the resources are 
allocated or the later the investment returns are estimated, the greater the tendency to 
postpone the decision to give up or allocate more resources to the project. Each project is 
associated with a life cycle model, where the return may be eventually, according to its life 
cycle. The decision -maker must know it in detail, because it is that life cycle model which 
defines the limits of rationality (the rationality region), through the TARR (Time adjusted 
Rate Return).  
Therefore, negative course of action situations can exist whose additional commitment is not 
irrational, provided one knows and controls the rationality region, that is, the zone where, in 
spite of the costs already lost, there is still time to recover the investment. But, the longer the 
project’s life cycle, the greater the tendency for the model phases to be confused and emerge 
from the rationality region and enter an irreversibly negative, continued course. 
Development of Hypotheses 
H1 - The decision to continue with an investment increases insofar as the amount already 
invested, the sunk cost, is greater and closer to what was planned for the total investment. 
 
Garland (1990) demonstrated that, before the threat of a competitor regarding a research and 
development project, the decision-makers’ desire to allocate more resources was linearly 
and positively related to the proportion of the budget already spent. The SCE was thus 
detected in the reinvestment decisions and in a linear way. But Garland and Newport (1991) 
in other studies, despite finding a strong, significant SCE presence in the decision to 





of total investment, did not, on the other hand, find any significant relationships between the 
decision to allocate further resources and the absolute amounts already invested. In other 
words, they did not find the presence of the SCE in reinvestment decisions when the 
investments already undertaken are expressed in absolute values, which is why the size of 
the investment already completed had no effect on the decision-maker’s behaviour. With the 
H1 hypothesis mentioned above, we shall have other elements to analyse this issue, as the 
size of the sunk cost will vary in absolute terms, which is why we shall be able to compare 
the decision-maker’s behaviour with the Garland and “Garland and Newport” studies. 
On the other hand, Simon (1957, 1978) also noted that decision-makers often use heuristics 
to deal with incomplete information conditions or information that is difficult to process. So 
as to reduce the time and effort in taking decisions, the decision-makers simplify the rules. 
Confidence in these mental accounting induce decision-makers to stop looking for and 
improving the information, and to speed up the decision - taking, which, for that reason, 
often prove to be a failure. And a heuristic like the Prospective Theory can also prompt the 
wrong decision and the escalating of investment. 
Kahneman and Tversky state that decision-makers often use sub-processes of combination, 
exclusion or codification of information, when confronted with comparative information 
about alternative decisions. They also consider that persons use some heuristics to simplify 
comparatives decisions. 
Information concerning similar consequences is sometimes inappropriately viewed from 
different mental accounting. This makes the decision-maker susceptible to framing tricks. 
That is, the same information given and shown in a different way is appreciated differently, 





to his norms, customs, personal characteristics, as well as his perception and formulation of 
the problem. 
This being so, in manipulating the point of reference, it is assumed there are different 
answers to a given decision, so, there could in this way be an influencing force in the sense 
of a less rational decision. 
In this sense, the hypothesis that I establish is that mental accountability expressed in 
relative magnitude, causes sunk costs in absolute value to have a smaller impact than in 
relative value. 
H2- The decision to continue to invest is greater when the sunk cost is expressed in relative 
terms with regard to what is planned, as opposed to the absolute values. 
Method 
In this chapter we shall study the Sunk Cost effect in decision-makers’ behaviour, with 
respect to its size and context. It is an experimental study with a sample of 200 persons, who 
individually take a single decision about a given scenario that is shown to them. 
Subjects 
The participants in this research were management undergraduates and postgraduate 
students at the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão of the Technical University of 
Lisbon. They were therefore students from different professionals backgrounds, different 
social statuses and different geographical origins. The total sample is made up of 200 
participants, divided into 8 groups of persons in each 48% were males and 52% females. 
The participants’ average age is 24, with a standard deviation of 7. 
Experimental Plan, Variables and Procedure 
The experimental plan is of the 2x4 type. The independent variable corresponds to the four 





and is related to the decision taken by each of the 200 subjects in “yes” or “no” terms, that 
is, either he/she continues with the investment or quits investing in each of the 8 different 
situations. 
The 200 persons sample was found by randomly choosing 8 classes from some 40 operating 
at the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão on that day. Then there was allocated to each 
selected class one of the 8 scenarios. This allocation was also performed randomly. 
Subsequently and because the classes consisted of more than 25 persons, within each class 
there were randomly chosen 25 students that formed part of the sample. 
In this way 8 groups of 25 participants each were found and each was attributed a different 
scenario. (appendix). 
So we have 8 situations, with 8 manipulations (appendixes): In absolute values: 450.000.00 
Euros, 350.000.00 Euros; 250.000.00 Euros; 50.000.00 Euros of investment already 
undertaken. In relative values: 90%; 70%; 50%; 10%, where the total cost value of the work 
is 500.000.00 Euros. 
Each participant was given a role with a scenario. The decisions to be taken concerned these 
scenarios. Each group of 25 persons was in the same room, seated at a table away from the 
others. The decision was individual, although there was one group per room. 
Each decision-maker had 20 minutes to read his scenario and decide about it. Each 
participant, who was only identified by sex and age, was confronted with one single 
decision-taking situation only. Beforehand they were told to participate in absolute silence 
and nobody was allowed to ask anything, either addresses the other participants or the 
professors monitoring them to ensure a correct procedure was followed. 
The procedure decision-makers and supervisors knew nothing about the research study. 





describe in this way:  
- Group AN1, investment level 1 corresponding to 450.000.00 Euros already invested and 
expressed in absolute values. 
- Group AN2, investment level 2 corresponding to 350.000.00 Euros already invested and 
expressed in absolute values. 
- Group AN3, investment level 3 corresponding to 250.000.00 Euros already invested and 
expressed in absolute values. 
- Group AN4, investment level 4 corresponding to 50.000.00 Euros already invested and 
expressed in absolute values. 
- Group RN1, investment level 1, corresponding to 90% of capital already invested and 
expressed in relative values. 
- Group RN2, investment level 2, corresponding to 70% of capital already invested and 
expressed in relative values. 
- Group RN3, investment level 3, corresponding to 50% of capital already invested and 
expressed in relative values. 
- Group RN 4, investment level 4, corresponding to 10% of capital already invested and 
expressed in relative values. 
The investment objective initially planned is 500.000.00 Euros, corresponding to the total 
cost of the work. This value, whether expressed as an absolute or percentage value, 
represents a base-reference of the investment process. 
Global Results 
Bearing in mind the investment level and the way in which the values were expressed, the 






Table 1. Total and partial frequencies of the contingency to continue or not with the investment in terms of 
formulation of the situation in absolute or relative (percentage) values and in terms of the four different 
investment levels (investment already made). 
 
LEVELS YES NO TOTAL
1
Absolute values - 450.000.00 Euros 19 6 25
Percentual values - 90% 19 6 25
Subtotal 38 12 50
2
Absolute values - 350.000.00 Euros 14 11 25
Percentual values - 70% 24 1 25
Subtotal 38 12 50
3
Absolute values - 250.000.00 Euros 13 12 25
Percentual values - 50% 21 4 25
Subtotal 34 16 50
4
Absolute values - 50.000.00 Euros 8 17 25
Percentual values - 10% 6 19 25





Hypothesis 1 results 
Hypothesis 1 considers that the probability of continuing with the investment increases 
insofar as what is already invested, a cost considered as lost, is greater in size and is closer 
to the estimated or planned total for the overall investment.  
The data distribution is to be found in the Total column of the “yes” answers of Table 1. As 
may be seen through the four levels the mode is situated between level 1 and level 2. The 
median is in level 2. On average, so that there be no difference between the levels, the 
persons who decide to continue with the investment (yes) per level should be 31. According 
to these 3 measures, we may conclude that they do not coincide. Therefore the present 





With a estimated value of 31 for each cell, compatible with the nil hypotheses of there being 
no significant differences between the various levels considered and using the Qui-Square 
sample distribution with 3 degrees of freedom and 5% significance level, we find a value of 
χ2 =12,77 and 0,01 > p > 0,001 with which we reject H0 . 
In other words, there is a significant difference between the distribution of the answers 
observed in the different levels of decision and a theoretical distribution where the decision 
makers’ answers were equally divided among the different levels of decision. Or, expressed 
in another way, it is not indifferent for the decision-maker to continue with a project at any 
of the levels.  
Besides the empirical evidence portrayed in the importance of the 2 first levels compared to 
the others and the importance of the 3th level compared to the last, I think that H1 is verified 
in this sample. In level 1, the decision to continue the investment is all too clear, either in 
absolute or relative values. 
Hypothesis 2 results 
 Hypothesis 2 considers that the decision to continue the investment is greater when the sunk 
cost notion is expressed in percentage terms, in comparison with the problem in absolute 
terms. In the first case, when the information is presented in percentage terms the decision to 
continue with an investment, even if it proves or gradually proves to be a failure, occurs a 
greater number of times. In this setting, the sunk cost effect, is greater. 
First, the answers, irrespective of the investment level, give us the following results in terms 
of the forms of values. 
 
 
Table 2: Total and partial frequencies of the contingency to continue or not with the investment in terms of 
formulation of the situation in absolute or relative (percentage) values 
 


































When using the Qui-square test with one degree of freedom and a significance level of 0,05, 
we find that χ2 = 4,77 that is 0,05 > p > 0,02, whereby we reject the H0 because there is no 
significant difference between the two situations. That is, there is a significant difference in 
the decision-taking depending on whether the information is expressed in absolute or 
percentage terms. 
Without detailing the investment level, Hypothesis 2 was verified in the case of the 200 
decisions. 
Let us see what happens in each of the levels of investment, by directly confronting the 
decisions to continue the investment with the decision not to continue the investment, when 










levels YES NO TOTAL
1
Absolute values - 450.000.00 Euros 19 6 25
Percentual values - 90% 19 6 25
Subtotal 38 12 50
2
Absolute values - 350.000.00 Euros 14 11 25
Percentual values - 70% 24 1 25
Subtotal 38 12 50
3
Absolute values - 250.000.00 Euros 13 12 25
Percentual values - 50% 21 4 25
Subtotal 34 16 50
4
Absolute values - 50.000.00 Euros 8 17 25
Percentual values - 10% 6 19 25





At first glance, we find that in level 1 of table 3 which summarises the subjects’ answers in 
continuing or not with the investment before 450.000.00 Euros or 90% of the planned 
investment, both groups gave the same answer. So, there is clearly no difference between 
the group of those who analysed the situations with information expressed in absolute terms 
and the group of those who analysed the same information but expressed in proportional 
terms. This means that at this investment level, the formulated hypothesis that the decision 
to continue with the investment is greater when the sunk cost is expressed in proportional 
terms, did not hold. 
In level 2 (Table 3) that summarises the answers of the subjects, faced with 350.000.00 
Euros or 70% of the planned investment, to continue the investment or not, one finds some 
difference in behaviour among the two groups, which clearly does not happen with the 
preceding groups. The decision-makers in this situation and in the circumstances shown in 





investment. On the other hand, the decision-makers, who in these circumstances had to 
decide about the same situation, but whose information was expressed in proportional terms, 
revealed a tendency to continue with the investment. 
In level 3 of investment (table 3) that summarises the answers of the subjects, faced with 
250.000.00 Euros or 50% of the planned investment, to continue the investment or not, we 
also encountered some apparently important differences in this first observation, between 
the two groups. Again, the group of decision-makers which answered according to the 
information expressed in absolute terms divided their answers between continuing or 
quitting the investment in a more balanced way, as opposed to the group which, in deciding 
precisely on the same investment level, already made, but expressed in proportional terms, 
revealed a tendency, as evident as in the preceding level, to continue with the investment. In 
these last two investment levels we should have to prove if the differences found are 
statistically significant or not. 
The last experimental situation related to hypotheses 2, considers an investment level of 
50.000.00 Euros or 10% of the total planned investment of 500.000.00 Euros. 
In this level, referred to as level 4, some similarity is noted in the behaviour of the two 
groups of decision-makers. Also as in level 1, where the investment already made was 
450.000.00 Euros or 90% of the total planned investment, in this level also no significant 
differences were revealed at first sight. The interesting difference for each of the other levels 
is that this is the only level where the negative answers clearly outnumbered the positive 
ones. 
This means that, in level 4, the decision not to continue with the investment is clearly 
assumed by the two groups’ decision-makers, both these who answered the problem in 





must evaluate the statistically significant similarity or difference between the decision-
makers’ behaviour in both groups. 
Therefore, in table 3, a greater tendency to continue the investment when the amount 
invested is expressed in percentage terms is visible compared to the corresponding situation 
presented in absolute terms. 
According to Siegel (1975)10, the most appropriate test to analyse the results found is the χ2 
(Qui-Square) test, which in this case is applied to a contingence table from 2x2 (which also 
permits a continuity correction that considerably improves the approximation to the Qui-
Square distribution, with one degree of freedom and 5% risk. 
Table 4: Decision on the Hypotheses 2 in terms of Qui-Square value and the probability associated with its 
occurrence for the different investment levels. 
LEVEL P
DECISION 
ACCORDING TO THE 
HYPOTHESES
1 YES NO YES NO 0,1 0,8 > p > 0,7 Ho is accepted
19 6 19 6
2 YES NO YES NO 8,881 0,01 > p > 0,001 Ho is rejected
14 11 24 1
3 YES NO YES NO 4,5 0,05 > p > 0,02 Ho is rejected
13 12 21 4
4 YES NO YES NO 0,099 0,8 > p > 0,7 Ho is accepted
8 17 6 19
450.000.00   EUROS 90%
INVESTMENT LEVEL
50.000.00   EUROS 10%
350.000.00   EUROS 70%
250.000.00   EUROS 50%
χ2
 
The Ho nil hypothesis is accepted both in level 1 of investment, where 450.000.00 Euros 
had already been spent, or 90% of total investment, and in level 4, where 50.000.00 Euros or 
                                                          





10% of the total investment had already been spent. This enables us to say that there is no 
significant difference between the two groups as to the decision-makers’ behaviour, should 
the information be expressed in absolute or percentage values. This means that in those two 
situations the H2 hypothesis did not occur, i.e., the decision to continue the investment was 
not greater when the investment made was expressed in percentage values of the planned 
investment, as opposed to the values expressed in absolute terms. 
On the other hand, the Qui-square values found, for level 2 concerning the investment value 
of 350.000.00 Euros in absolute terms or 70% of the total investment in relative terms, and 
for level 3 concerning an investment value of 250.000.00 Euros or 50% of the total planned 
investment, in absolute and relative terms respectively, enable us to say that there is no 
major difference between the two decision groups. This means that in these two situations 
the way in w00hich the problem was presented was not immaterial. Contrarily, the decision-
makers’ behaviour was significantly different in statistical terms, depending on whether the 
scenario was presented in absolute or relative (percentage) terms. 
Having thus verified the significant behaviour difference, it remains to test the greater or 
lesser association between the variables, that is, if the decisions to continue or otherwise 
with the investment were more associated with one of the two types of framing. Therefore, 
by applying the Yule coefficient 11 to measure the degree and sign of the association 
between the variables, in the situations where the significant difference in the decision-
maker’s behaviour was statistically proven i.e., in investment level 2 and 3, it was confirmed 
that in level 2, where the investment already made, at the time the decision was taken, was 
350.000.00 Euros or 70% of the total investment, there was a negative association12 between 





coefficient, Y=-0,899, according to Davis13 represents a very strong, almost perfect negative 
association. 18 This means, therefore, that the Yes decisions (keeping up with the 
investment) are very strongly associated with the Relative Values’ presentation of the 
problem. 
In level 3, where the investment already made before taking the decision, expressed in 
absolute terms was of 250.000.00 Euros, as opposed to a relative (percentage) expression of 
50%, the Yule coefficient shows us that there is a negative association14 between the Yes’s 
and the Absolute Values, (Y=-0,65). According to Davis, this is a substantial negative 
association, albeit not so strong as the preceding one, but nevertheless, of a high degree. 
This therefore means that the Yes’s decisions are substantially associated with the Relative 
Values. 
According to hypothesis H2, where the decision to continue with the investment is higher 
when 0the investment already made is expressed in Relative (percentage) Terms of the 
planned investment, as opposed to the investment expressed in absolute values, the data 
shown in table 4 shows that, after analysis, the decision to continue is higher when the sunk 
costs are expressed in relative (percentage) terms, as opposed to the values expressed in 
absolute terms. 
We can therefore conclude that the H2 formulated hypothesis is tested and verified on the 
investment levels already made of 350.000.00 Euros or 70% of the total planned investment, 
and 250.000.00 Euros or 50% of the total planned investment, but that the same H2 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 Yule, G.U., “On a Method of Investigating Periodicities in Disturbed Series, with Special Reference to 
Wolfer’s Sundpot Numbers” - Philosophical Stansactions, vol. A226, 1927. 
12 In table 5, the ratio 14/25 is less than ratio 24/25 
13 Davis, J.A., “Elementary Survey Analysis” - New Jersey, Prentice-Hill, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1971. 






hypothesis was not verified in the investment levels of 450.000.00 and 50.000.00 Euros or 
90% and 10% of the total investment respectively. 
Discussion 
To a large extent irrational behaviour prompted this study. From the beginning the costs 
were considered as lost, in general, they were referred to as an important reason for 
irrational behaviour. I started by working this Sunk Cost Effect (SCE), by considering them 
as differentiated sunk costs, according to four different investment levels and in terms of the 
formulation of values expressed in absolute and relative terms. To what extent could this 
differentiation of the costs considered as lost influence the taking of decisions regarded as 
irrational? And, which justifications are more relevant to continuation of such investments? 
That is, what are the real motivations for an escalating behaviour in a negative course of 
action? 
Hypothesis 
The majority of the results of this work supports the hypothesis formulated. 
According to hypothesis 1, the decision to continue with an investment grows insofar as 
what is lready invested , the cost considered as lost, is greater in size and is closer to the 
planned investment, and the results strongly prove that the higher the investment made, and 
having no good results (sunk costs) the higher the motivation to allocate resources. 
This study only partially proved the findings of Garland and Newport (1991) that when a 
budget is made for a particular course of action, the sunk cost impact on any decision to 
continue the course of action is a crescendo function, both positively and linearly, according 
to the proportion of that cost in relation to the original budget. 
In fact, in global terms, above a particular value the function increases more timidly and not 





of investment, corresponding to 50.000.00 Euros already invested, the decision-makers 
clearly choose not to reinvest. At this level it could be said that there is no sunk costs or that 
rationality in the interference criteria. Above 50% there were always sunk costs. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the magnitude of the sunk costs tends to increase 
the will to invest, but in this study when we turned from level 4 to level 3, which meant 
increasing the sunk cost by 200.000.00 Euros (10% to 50%), the number of decision-makers 
that agreed to continue with the investment, more than duplicated, whereas when we 
changed from level 3 to level 1, which meant increasing the sunk cost by the same 
200.000.00 Euros (50% to 90%), the number of decision-makers willing to continue with 
the investment increased only slightly (11%). And from level 2 to level 1 there was no 
increase. In comparing our findings with Garland and Newport’s studies there has been 
detected in this study neither positivity nor linearity, nor the function which established the 
relation between the sunk cost and the value already spent which proved to be rising. 
The data lead us to admit that these is a frontier which clearly determines the value above 
which one should continue and below which one quits. And this could be one of the reasons 
for the disproportional crescendo or decrease of the function. This value is given in my 
study by level 3, the 50% or 250.000.00 Euros, but I admit that it could be situated between 
level 3 and level 4 (between 10% and 50%). 
On the other hand and without prejudicing the analysis of the results made above, it is clear 
to see that there are many different forms of behaviour resulting from the presentation made 
in absolute or relative terms. In fact, in the absolute terms’ presentation the highest number 
of decisions to continue to invest (the highest point of the function) is shown in level 1, 
corresponding to 450.000.00 Euros of investment made compared to the 500.000.00 Euros 





corresponds to the situation in which the majority of the decision makers opted to continue 
investment was in level 2, corresponding to 70% of investment already made. Therefore, as 
we have seen, the Garland and Newport function not only behaves as a proportionally 
growing one, but also reveals itself as non-growing or even registering a negative increase, 
in this case when the presentation of values is in relative terms. It therefore appears to me 
that the tension towards allocating more resources is higher when the magnitude is shown in 
relative values. When facing absolute values, the decision-maker chooses to continue with 
non-proportional growing investment, but directly related to the cost volume considered as 
lost, that is, the higher the cost taken as lost, the higher the number of decision-makers are 
inclined to continue with the investment. But, when faced with relative values, this 
propensity also exists in relation to the magnitude of the cost lost, but reaches its maximum 
value earlier, in 70% of the investment made, whereas with absolute values this was reached 
with the absolute equivalent of 90%. 
As we said, the frontier dividing the decision to invest or not to invest seems to be close to 
the absolute equivalent value of 50% of the investment made and considered as lost, but it 
may in fact lie below that threshold when, principally, the values are shown in relative 
terms. 
The results proved that the decision to continue with the investment is higher when the sunk 
cost is expressed in proportional terms as opposed to absolute values, in accordance with the 
expectations of hypothesis 2, the decision to continue to invest is greater when the sunk cost 
is expressed in relative (proportional) terms in relation to the planned investment, as 
opposed to the absolute values. The irrationality of the decision increases according to the 
relative (percentage) expression of the values. However, in level 1 and level 4 situations, in 





groups of decision-makers, that is, in extreme situations (level 1: 450.000/500.000 or 
90/100; level 4: 50.000/500.000 or 10/100) the presentation form of the values did not 
significantly influence the decision-makers’ behaviour, despite the fact that in the first there 
is SCE whereas in the second there is no SCE. In the two other situations (level 2 and level 
3) the hypothesis formulated is clearly proved. The answers in favour of continuing with the 
investment (YES), in these two cases, are almost the double that of the others (NO), when 
the values are presented in proportional terms. There is thus a greater influence of sunk costs 
on the decision-makers derived from the way of presenting the situations in relative 
(percentage) terms, at least in the non-extreme situations (level 2: 350.000/500.000 or 
70/100; level 3: 250.000/500.000 or 50/100). 
Escalating Behaviour 
As we have seen, of the 200 decision makers, one hundred and twenty four, 62%, opted to 
continue with the failing project. The decision-makers orientation was not motivated by 
economic-like principles, on the contrary, it demonstrated irrational behaviour. This 
behaviour is affected by the Sunk Cost Effect, causing an escalation according to the size of 
the cost already lost. 
In this connection it is interesting to mention a research work by Schaubroeck and Davis 
(1994) where escalating behaviour is attributed to the decision-maker’s lack of alternatives. 
The decision to reinvest versus quitting is, in authors’ opinion one, of the principal causes of 
escalating behaviour. In fact even for those decision-makers who have nothing to do with 
the initial decisions, the escalating behaviour, when faced with negative courses of action, 
may be the decision to take as there is no alternative, and by this means there could be some 
hope of future benefits, compatible, in fact, with what was said about the prospective theory, 





We can conclude, therefore, that both for those responsible for the initial decisions and 
whose reputation was at stake and those that did not interfere in the course of action, 
escalating behaviour depends on the different ways in which the problem is formulated. This 
means that the search for alternative solutions for the persistence or quitting dilemma, as 
well as being more suited to today’s multifaceted realities, provides a better defence against 
the risks of escalation in negative courses of action. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The persons involved are mainly students with no professional experience. Approximately 
20% of them are master’s students or the equivalent with some experience in decision - 
taking at a personal and professional level, which is not the case with the remaining 80% 
that are only students from the business field. This could be one limitation. 
Also, what could also be considered as a possible limitation is the fact that in the scenario 
proposed to the decision-makers, they are placed as persons responsible for the first and 
subsequent decisions, though the personal component is never isolated. In other words, at 
the time of taking the decision to continue or not with the project, would the decision-
makers reveal identical forms of behaviour to those shown in this study if the decisions that 
led to the costs regarded as lost and they had found had been taken by others? This fact may 
be considered both as a limitation as well as an invitation for future research. 
As future research I would also like to see analysed the effect, that could be called mental 
accountability, on a decision concerning sunk costs. The values shown in proportional form 
help the decision-maker when taking his decision. But, could it be that the presentation of 
the values in proportional terms will produce results for a decision to continue with an 
investment, when the decision-maker, faced with absolute values does not know what action 





Euros? Or would it be a lot to spend 250.000.00 Euros when he has already spent 
250.000.00 Euros? The conviction with which one takes a decision is probably not the same 
in both cases. Thence, the decision-maker resorts to another type of aid for his decision-
making. The core question is to know if, a priori, it exists, and what the frontier is to reverse 
the decision. That is, what is the value above or below which the decision-maker normally 
opts to continue or quit an investment? As referred to earlier, a study should be made in an 
attempt to find the answer to the closest value of such a frontier, since, in this study it is 
given as 50% or 250.000.00 Euros (level 3), but as the next investment level made was 10% 
or 50.000.00 Euros (level 4) it is very likely that the frontier could lie between 50% and 
10% in the case of proportional values. And could it be that the frontier is the same whether 
the values in question be expressed as absolute values and proportional values? In this study 
it seemed to be so, but as I said, there was a great difference between investment levels 3 
and 4. These facts are thus a limitation, besides an invitation to future studies at the same 
time. 
In this study, from the outset, the decision-maker knew the total amount budgeted and 
anticipated to invest in the project (500.000.00 Euros). This value will have certainly acted 
as an important point of reference for appreciation regarding the end of the task. Thus, the 
end of the task was more easily perceived. But what was the real importance of that point of 
reference in decision  - taking? I think there are grounds for interesting future research. 
Finally, it would certainly be both relevant and possible, through future research, to analyse 
in greater depth the motivations for the escalating behaviour in presence of sunk costs. The 
way, though limited whereby this theme was handled in this study, was sufficient to enable 
one to see that with a larger sample and with a searching contents’ analysis, it would be 






As mentioned and covered, this study concludes that in most situations the tendency for 
irrational behaviour increases with the size of sunk costs, and that, when formulated in 
proportional terms, this is a factor of greater relevance to what is regarded as irrational 
behaviour. 
In a course of action which begins to reveal negative tendencies hesitation, waiting, late 
decision-taking, may lead to a worsening of the final result by “enslavement” of the course 
of action itself according to the size that the sunk cost gradually assumes. 
The actual benefit of doubt, which is commonly known as a generous way of solving 
conflicts, could all too often be the reason for escalating behaviour in a negative course of 
action. 
This study also concludes that there is a strong personal component of emotional motivation 
in the decision to continue with a loosing project, namely when one detects self-justifying 
forms of behaviour, over-esteem or psychological (motivational) tension when confronted 
with an incomplete task. 
There is also in the decision maker one element associated with risk. Very often the decision 
-maker does not accept certain losses, preferring to continue with his course of action in the 
hope of a future recovery. 
The Sunk Cost Effect is really something that exists and haunts the decision-maker. It also 
seems to be the result of the decision-maker’s concern in reaching the initially defined goal. 
The closer the decision-maker is to what is planned, the greater the tendency for the SCE to 
show up. It would seem interesting to conclude that even when facing initially projected, 
budgeted goals, the concern to finish the task may lead to situations which far exceed what 





Therefore, definition of goals and their control from the beginning should be a constant 
preoccupation of the decision-maker, so that he may, as early as possible, in other words, 
with a lower volume of sunk costs or as far from the end as possible, correct his decisions, 
because, as we saw, the frontier for reversing the rational to the irrational decision was 
below 50% of the anticipated investment. 
In short and as a conclusion, this study reveals that SCE exists and motivates irrational 
forms of behaviour from an economic standpoint. These forms of behaviour differ 
depending on the size and framing of the investment already made. The size of the sunk cost 
increases the willingness to invest. And should the size of the sunk cost be shown in relative 
terms as opposed to presentation in absolute terms, there is a greater tendency to continue 
with the investment. 
APPENDIX 
Situation I – GROUP Ani / Rni, i = 1…4 
You are an important decision-maker of a chain of “Leisure and Resting Centres”. You have just bought some 
pieces of land beside a municipal road whose daily traffic is very heavy: cars, trucks, tourist coaches, goods 
vehicles, various excursions, etc. 
Due to the lack of space to park, rest and have meals, you have managed to get a project approved to set up on 
this site a large centre which includes accommodation,, meals, entertainment parks, etc. following long, 
difficult negotiations with the local government authorities, while anticipating the enormous interest that it will 
arouse in local and passing citizens. The cost of this investment is 500.000.00 Euros. 
1. You have already spent ____________ Euros / _______% of the project 
Meanwhile, after the initial investment, you are personally and privately informed (absolutely certain 
information) from a close, influential friend, that very soon a motor-road(auto highway) will be built, will pass 
beside the existing local road and take the present local traffic off it. 
To complete the initial project you still need to invest __________ Euros / ____% of the project. 
Will you take the decision to invest the last __________ Euros / _____ %, knowing that if you do not, nothing 






ARKES, H.R. and BLUMER, C.(1985). The Psychology of Sunk Cost Organizational behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 35, pp 124-140. 
BARON, J.(1990). Harmful Heuristics and the Improvement of Thinking. Developmental Perspectives on 
Teaching and Learning Thinking Skills. Contrib. Hum Dev. Basel, Karger, 1990, vol 21, pp 28-47. 
BAZERMAN, M. and NEALE, M.(1992). Nonrational Escalation of commitment in Negotiation. European 
Management Journal, jun1992, pp 163-168 
BROCKNER, J.(1982). Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflits: The importance of timing. 
Journal of Research in Personality 16, pp 247-266. 
CHERMACK , J.M.(1992). Political Risk Analysis, Past and Present.Resources Policy, September 





CONLON , E. and WOLF , G.(1983). The Architecture of a Course of Action: Case Studies and Their 
Implications. Working Paper Series nº 83-22. August 1983.The University of Iowa. 
CONLON , E. and WOLF , G.(1984). The Ecology of Sunk Cost Problems. Paper presented at the National 
Academy of Management Meetings, Boston, Mass., August 1984. 
CONLON , E. and WOLF , G.(1980) The Moderating Effects of Strategy, Visibility and Involvement on 
Allocation Behavior: An Extension of Staws Escalation Paradigm. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 26, pp 172-192. 
FRISCH , D.(1993). Reasons For Framing Effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
54, pp 399-429. 
GARLAND , H .(1990).Throwing Good Money After Bad :The Effect of Sunk Cost on the Decision to 
Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project. Journal of Applied Psycology 1990, vol.75, nº6, pp 728-731. 
GARLAND , H. and SANDEFUR , C. and ROGERS , A.C.(1990). De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil 
Exploration: When Sunk Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide. Journal of Applied Psycology 1990,vol.75, 
nº6, pp 721-727. 
GARLAND , H. and NEWPORT , S.(1991). Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the Decision to 
Persist with a Course of Action. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 48, pp 55-69. 
GREEN, J. and OLIVEIRA, M.(1991). Testes Estatísticos em Psicologia. Imprensa Universitária.Editorial 
Estampa. 
HARRISON , P. and HARRELL , A.(1993). Impact of Adverse Selection on Managers. Project Evaluation 
Decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 1993, vol36, nº3, pp 635-643. 
KAHNEMAN, D. and TVERSKY, A.(1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. 
Econometrica, vol.47, nº2, pp. 263-291.  
KAHNEMAN,D. and TVERSKY, A.(1981). The Framing of Decisions and The Psycology of Choice. 
Science, volume 211, 30 January 1981, pp. 453-458.  
KANODIA , C. and BUSHMAN , R. and DICKHAUT , J.(1989) Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: 
An Explanation Based on Reputation and Information Asymmetries. Journal of Accouting Research, 1989, 
vol.27, nº1, pp 59-77. 
SOUSA , E. A Dimensão social das Atribuições: Uma análise Teórica - Análise Psicológica-Setembro 1988 
 NORTHCRAFT , G.B. and WOLF , G.(1984). Dollars , Sense and Sunk Costs :  
A Life Cycle Model of Resource Allocation Decisions. Academy of Management Review, 1984, vol9, nº2, pp 
225-234. 
PEREIRA , O.G.(1980). Psicologia Económica: Disciplina do Futuro. Psicologia por Antologia, Volume1, 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa.  
RAPOPORT , A. and CHAMMAH ,A.(1965). Prisoner's Dilema.The University of Michigan. 
RIBEIRO,J.S.(1982). Systems in Tension of Lewin’s Field Theory.Zeigarnick Effects and Socially Mediated 
Zeigarnik Effects. New York, Columbia University-Teachers College. 
RIBEIRO,J.S.(1990). Decisions Over Time in Conditions of Economic Adversity: A Social Psycological 
Analysis. Columbia University. 
ROSS ; J. and STAW ,B.M.(1994). Organizational escalation and exit : Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant. Academy of Management Journal v36nº4, pp 701-732. 
RUMIATI , R. , BONINI , N. and LEGRENZI , P.(1993). La Persistenza Nella Decisione: Quando una Perdita 
Diventa un Costo e Quando un Costo Rimane una Perdita. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, a. xx,nº1, febbraio 
1993 
RUTLEDGE, R.W.(1994). Escalation of Commitment in Groups and Moderating Effects of Information 
Framing. Management Research News: MRN v17nº1,2, pp. 12-24. 
SCHAUBROECK, J. and DAVIS, E. (1994). Prospect Theory Preditions when Escalation is not the only 
Chance to Recover Sunk Costs. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57, pp 59-82. 
SCHAUBROECK , J. and WILLIAMS , S.(1993). Behavioral Causality Orientations and Investment decisions 
Following Negative Feedback. Journal of Applied Social Psycology, 23, 16, pp. 1303-1320.   
   
SIEGEL, S.(1975).Estatística não Paramétrica para as Ciências do Comportamento. Mcgraw-Hill. 
SINGER , A.E.(1993). Strategy with Sunk Costs. IOS Press, Human Systems Management 12 pp. 97-113. 
STAW , B. M. ande ROSS , J.(1989). Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations. Science, vol.246, 
Articles, 13 October 1989, pp. 216-220. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
